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COURT	COURT OF KING'S BENCH OF ALBERTA	
JUDICIAL CENTRE	CALGARY	
	IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, C. C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF WESTPHALIA DEV. CORP.	
APPLICANT	WESTPHALIA DEV. CORP.	
DOCUMENT	**BRIEF OF LAW** **(CCAA INITIAL ORDER)**	

ADDRESS FOR SERVICE AND CONTACT INFORMATION OF PARTY FILING THIS DOCUMENT	Norton Rose Fulbright Canada LLP 400 3rd Avenue SW, Suite 3700 Calgary, Alberta T2P 4H2 CANADA Howard A. Gorman, K.C. / Meghan L. Parker howard.gorman@nortonrosefulbright.com meghan.parker@nortonrosefulbright.com Tel: +1 403.267.8222 Fax: +1 403.264.5973 Lawyers for the Applicant, Westphalia Dev. Corp. File no.: 1001326363

INTRODUCTION

1. This Brief of Law is submitted on behalf of Westphalia Dev. Corp. (**WDC**, or the **Applicant**), in support of its originating application (the **Application**) for an initial order (the **Initial Order**) under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*,[1] as amended (the **CCAA**), which, if granted, would:

    i. declare that the Applicant is a company to which the CCAA applies;

    ii. stay all proceedings and remedies taken or that might be taken in respect of the Applicant or any of its property, except as set forth in the Initial Order or as otherwise permitted by law, for 10 days (as may be extended by the Court thereafter);

[1] *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, RSC 1985, c C-36 [**CCAA**] [**Tab 1**]

iii. authorize the Applicant to carry on business in a manner consistent with the preservation of its property and business;

iv. authorize the Applicant to make certain essential payments to creditors;

v. appoint FTI Consulting Canada Inc. as the monitor of the Company (**FTI** or the **Monitor**) under section 11.7 of the CCAA;

vi. approve certain priority charges with respect to activities occurring in the first 10 days following pronouncement of the Initial Order, including the Administration Charge and D&O Charge, as defined below;

vii. authorize payment of the reasonable fees and disbursements of the Monitor, the Monitor's legal counsel, and the Applicant's counsel (the **Professional Fees**);

viii. deem service of the within Application for an Initial Order to be good and sufficient; and

ix. provide such further and other relief as the Applicant may request and this Honourable Court may grant.

2. In support of its Application, the Applicant relies upon the CCAA, and the Affidavit of Bryce Tingle, K.C., filed concurrently with the Application (the **Tingle Affidavit**).[2] Capitalized terms not otherwise defined take their meaning from the Tingle Affidavit.

3. This Brief of Law is intended to outline the legislation and jurisprudence pertinent to the relief being sought by WCD in the Initial Order, scheduled for Tuesday, January 14, 2025 at 3:30pm before the Honourable Justice C. Feasby.

FACTS

4. The Applicant was incorporated on January 4, 2012, under the laws of the Province of Alberta.[3]

5. The Applicant is an entity set up to raise and deploy capital in a specific land development project (the **Project**) located in Prince George's County, Maryland, USA. The Applicant's objective is to work through its subsidiary, Walton Westphalia Development (USA), LLC (the **US Subsidiary**), to acquire, entitle (zone) land, and then develop and sell parcels to residential and commercial builders and end users. The Applicant does not have the

[2] Affidavit of Bryce Tingle, K.C., sworn January 13, 2025, [**Tingle Affidavit**].
[3] Tingle Affidavit at para 16.

personnel to carry out these objectives and therefore hired a third party project manager, Walton Development & Management (USA) Inc., to carry out these objectives.[4]

6. The Applicant is managed by Walton Global Investments Ltd. (**WGIL** or the **Manager**) pursuant to a Management Services Agreement, dated February 27, 2012, as between the Applicant and Walton Asset Management L.P. (**WAM**), as assigned and novated to WGIL on April 1, 2018, pursuant to an Assignment and Assumption Agreement (collectively, the **Management Services Agreement**). WGIL is a Canadian company that is part of a larger group of corporations, trusts and partnerships, made up of a large number of entities in Canada, with sister operations in the United States.[5]

7. For the past several years, the Applicant has operated and could only continue to operate with the ongoing financial support of certain stakeholders, including the Manager. The Applicant has been unable to pay management fees owing to the Manager (and the Manager's predecessor) since 2016. While activities on the Project are ongoing, the Project has encountered significant regulatory delays and requires substantial further funding to be completed, which in turn requires the support of the Manager and other stakeholders of the Applicant.[6]

8. The Manager has now advised the Applicant that it cannot continue to provide services and funding on a go forward basis unless a plan is put in place to address the Applicant's liquidity and outstanding debts to the Manager and others. Absent this support, the Applicant would be unable to meet its immediate obligations as they come due, including the professional fees and other costs that will soon be incurred in order for the Applicant, as a public company, to meet upcoming audit and reporting obligations.[7]

9. The Applicant's circumstances have become dire to the point that the company urgently needs to restructure its affairs. The indebtedness of the Applicant is in excess of $5,000,000.[8]

10. The Board of Directors has committed to putting in place a plan to deal with these matters. The Applicant therefore seeks an Order of the Court that would allow it to restructure its affairs pursuant to the CCAA.[9]

ISSUES

11. The issues before the Court are:

    a) Does the CCAA apply to the Applicant?

    b) Is granting the Stay of Proceedings appropriate?

    c) Are the priority charges necessary and appropriate?

LAW AND ARGUMENT

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[4] Tingle Affidavit at para 13.
[5] Tingle Affidavit at para 14.
[6] Tingle Affidavit at para 10.
[7] Tingle Affidavit at para 11.
[8] Tingle Affidavit at para 8-9.
[9] Tingle Affidavit at para 12.

a. The CCAA Applies to the Applicant

12. The Court has jurisdiction to grant protection under the CCAA to a "debtor company" where the total claims against such company exceed $5 million. The CCAA defines "debtor company" as including "any company that is bankrupt or insolvent" – but it does not define "insolvent".[10]

13. "Insolvency" for the purposes of the CCAA is informed, but not dictated, by the definition of "insolvent person" under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, RSC 1985, c B-3 (the **BIA**). "[I]nsolvent person" is defined in section 2 of the BIA, as follows:

> **insolvent person** means a person who is not bankrupt and who resides, carries on business or has property in Canada, whose liabilities to creditors provable as claims under this Act amount to one thousand dollars, and
>
> **(a)** who is for any reason unable to meet his obligations as they generally become due,
>
> **(b)** who has ceased paying his current obligations in the ordinary course of business as they generally become due, or
>
> **(c)** the aggregate of whose property is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient, or, if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process, would not be sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing due;[11]

14. If a company is insolvent under the BIA, it is necessarily insolvent for the purposes of the CCAA.[12] However, the conceptualization of insolvency under the CCAA is broader than under the BIA in order to give effect to the CCAA's rehabilitative objectives. As such, a financially troubled company is insolvent for the purposes of the CCAA if it is "reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within a reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring."[13]

15. In this case, the Applicant has debts in excess of $5 million and is insolvent on a cash flow basis.[14] Without the ongoing funding that has historically been provided by the Manager, the Applicant will shortly be unable to meet its obligations as they generally become due.[15]

16. Considering the above, it is appropriate for the Court to find that the CCAA applies to the Applicant.

b. Granting the Stay of Proceedings is Appropriate

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[10] *CCAA*, ss 2 and 3 [**Tab 1**].
[11] *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, RSC 1985, c B-3 at s 2 [**BIA**] [**Tab 2**]; *Stelco Inc, Re,* 2004 CanLII 24933 (ONSC) leave to appeal refused, at para 22 [***Stelco***] [**Tab 3**].
[12] *Stelco,* para 22 [**Tab 3**].
[13] *Stelco*, para 26 [**Tab 3**].
[14] Tingle Affidavit at para 58-59.
[15] Tingle Affidavit at paras 10-12.

17. An Initial Order under the CCAA should be granted if it accords with the remedial purposes of the CCAA, which include rehabilitation, the avoidance of social and economic loss resulting from liquidation, and the building of consensus among interested stakeholders.[16]

18. An Initial Order may include any relief that is reasonably necessary for the continued operations of the debtor company in the ordinary course during the restructuring period.[17]

19. Such relief may (and typically does) include a stay of proceedings, which ensures that creditor enforcement does not interfere with the company's ability to maintain operations while restructuring its affairs.[18] The stay of proceedings maintains the *status quo* while the company develops a plan for the benefit of its creditors.[19]

20. The threshold for a debtor company to obtain a stay of proceedings under the CCAA is low. The company only has to satisfy the Court that a stay of proceedings would "usefully further" its efforts to reorganize. The debtor company is not required to put forward anything more than a germ of a plan that requires protection.[20]

21. Since November 1, 2019, when certain amendments to the CCAA became effective, any stay of proceedings in an Initial Order under the CCAA is restricted to ten days,[21] albeit subject to extension at the comeback application and subsequently thereafter. The necessity of having a comeback application after only ten days has the effect of minimizing prejudice to creditors who may have received short or no notice of the Initial Application. Any creditor with concerns about the adequacy of service is only required to wait ten days to make its case in opposition to the debtor company's filing or the resulting stay of proceedings.

22. A debtor company is expected to act in good faith and with due diligence both before and after the commencement of proceedings under the CCAA; however, any in-depth analysis of good faith and due diligence is ordinarily deferred to subsequent applications.[22] The existence of financially challenging circumstances is not evidence of an absence of good faith or due diligence on the part of the debtor company.

23. In this case, the Applicant has acted with good faith and due diligence in addressing its cash flow and liquidity, and by filing under the CCAA to facilitate a restructuring of its business and affairs. As is disclosed in FTI's Pre-Filing Report, the proposed Monitor has expressed satisfaction that the relief being sought by the Applicant is necessary, reasonable and justified in the circumstances.[23]

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[16] *Century Services Inc v Canada (Attorney General),* 2010 SCC 60, at paras 15, 18, 59, 70 [***Century Services***] [**Tab 4**].
[17] *CCAA*, s 11.001 [**Tab 1**]; see also *Century Services* at paras 60-62 [**Tab 4**].
[18] *CCAA*, s 11.02 [**Tab 1**].
[19] *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd, Re*, 1993 OJ No 14, 17 CBR (3d) 24 (Ont SCJ) at paras 5-6 [**Tab 5**]; *Meridian Developments v Toronto Dominion Bank*, 1984 CanLII 1176 (AB KB) at para 15 [**Tab 6**].
[20] *Century Services* at para 70 [**Tab 4**]; *Industrial Properties Regina Limited v Copper Sands Land Corp*, 2018 SKCA 36 at para 21 [***Industrial Properties***] [**Tab 7**]; *Alberta Treasury Branches v Tallgrass Energy Corp*, 2013 ABQB 432 at para 14 [**Tab 8**].
[21] *CCAA*, s 11.02(1) [**Tab 1**].
[22] *Industrial Properties* at paras 22-23 [**Tab 7**].
[23] Pre-Filing Report of the Proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc, filed concurrently with the Application at para 43 (**Pre-Filing Report**).

24. Further, the Applicant, in consultation with the Manager and other stakeholders, has formulated the outline of a restructuring plan designed to allow it to continue its business, which contemplates the following steps:

    i. the Manager and its affiliated and sister companies will continue to raise debt capital to support the financing required to complete the Project;

    ii. the US Subsidiary will undertake efforts to increase the amount of secured debt available, which will provide liquidity to service the secured debt and to fund the necessary development to get the lands fully entitled;

    iii. immediately stabilize the Applicant's cash flows and operations;

    iv. develop a strategy and plan that will address the liquidity issues faced by the Applicant that will generate sufficient revenue to sustain itself;

    v. continue ongoing efforts to seek purchasers and developers for the Property;

    vi. continue the Applicant's present efforts to restructure and streamline operations;

    vii. establish an efficient claims process, by which all claims against the Applicant can be identified and resolved with a view to formulating a plan of compromise and arrangement for presentation to its creditors;

    viii. investigate converting the significant related party indebtedness to new voting equity or amend and extend the repayment terms for such indebtedness, as supported by professional tax advice; and

    ix. consider and take steps in respect of the Class B Shares, including the possibility of cancelling and extinguishing all of the issued and outstanding Class B Shares.

25. It is respectfully submitted that the evidence put forward supports the Applicant's request for a stay of proceedings.

c. The Priority Charges are Necessary and Appropriate

26. The Applicant seeks the below charges, which are all reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances.

i. Administration Charge

27. The Applicant seeks the approval of a charge of $100,000 that would act as security for the Professional Fees and disbursements incurred before and after the granting of the Initial Order (the **Administration Charge**).

28. The CCAA authorizes the Court to grant a priority charge in respect of professional fees and disbursements on notice to affected secured creditors.[24]

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[24] *CCAA*, s 11.52 [**Tab 1**].

29. In *Re Canwest Publishing Inc.,* the Ontario Superior Court of Justice stated that the factors to consider in determining whether to approve an administration charge include:

    a) the size and complexity of the businesses being restructured;

    b) the proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge;

    c) whether there is an unwarranted duplication of roles;

    d) whether the quantum of the proposed charge appears to be fair and reasonable;

    e) the position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; and

    f) the position of the Monitor.[25]

30. Courts have recognized that administration charges, as well as charges in favour of directors and officers, are often necessary to ensure a debtor company's successful restructuring. For example, in *Re Timminco*, Morawetz J. (now C.J.) stated that failing to provide such charges would "result in the overwhelming likelihood that the CCAA proceedings would come to an abrupt halt, followed, in all likelihood, by bankruptcy proceedings".[26]

31. In the instant case, an Administration Charge is necessary in light of the size and complexity of the restructuring and the necessary involvement of qualified professionals. The Applicant requires the knowledge, expertise and continuing participation of the beneficiaries of the proposed Administration Charge in order to successfully restructure its significant debt.

32. The proposed Monitor has advised in its Pre-Filing Report that such quantum is appropriate in light of the anticipated complexity of the CCAA proceedings, and the services to be provided by the beneficiaries of the Administration Charge.[27]

33. The Applicant has no secured indebtedness. As such, there is no risk that secured creditors of the Administration Charge would be unaware of, or prejudiced by, the Applicant's proposed Administration Charge.

ii. D&O Charge

34. The Applicant seeks approval of a charge for $25,000 for continued compensation to the Applicant's directors and officers (the **D&O Charge**).

35. Under section 11.51 of the CCAA, the Court may grant a charge in favour of directors and officers in an amount the Court considers appropriate. The purpose of the D&O Charge is to indemnify directors and officers against any obligations or liabilities that may arise after the Initial Order is granted, thereby retaining the directors and officers "in place" in order to avoid destabilization and assist with the restructuring.[28]

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[25] *Canwest Publishing Inc,* 2010 ONSC 222 at para 54 [***Canwest***] [**Tab 9**].
[26] *Re Timminco Ltd*, 2012 ONSC 506 at para 66 [**Tab 10**].
[27] Pre-Filing Report at para 36.
[28] *Canwest Global Communications Corp (Re),* 2009 CanLII 55114 (ON SC) at para 48 [**Tab 11**].

36. Section 11.51(4) of the CCAA provides that any D&O Charge cannot apply to liabilities arising from gross negligence or wilful misconduct. This caveat is reflected in the Alberta Template CCAA Initial Order and was not modified in the Applicant's proposed form of Initial Order.

37. In addition, the Alberta Template CCAA Initial Order contemplates a directors and officers charge that does not duplicate coverage already provided by directors and officers insurance. This was not modified in the Applicant's proposed form of Initial Order.

38. In this case, a successful restructuring of the Applicant's business and affairs requires the continued participation of the directors and officers.[29] These individuals have significant institutional knowledge and expertise that cannot be replicated, and they have a history of responsibility for key stakeholder relationships.

39. The proposed quantum of the D&O Charge, in the amount of $25,000, is modest and reasonable in the circumstances. The proposed Monitor has advised in its Pre-Filing Report that such quantum is appropriate.[30]

40. As noted above, there are no secured creditors of the Applicant, and thus no risk of prejudice to holders of secured indebtedness arising as a result. The primary creditors of WDC are unsecured creditors, and both have been given notice of the proposed charges.

41. Given the above, the Applicant respectfully submits that all three of the Charges for which approval is sought is reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances.

CONCLUSION

42. In conclusion, and in consideration of the foregoing, the Applicant respectfully requests that this Honourable Court grant the Initial Order in the form attached to the Application.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 14TH DAY OF January, 2025

Norton Rose Fulbright Canada LLP

Per: _____

Howard A. Gorman, K.C., and Meghan L. Parker
Counsel for the Applicant, Westphalia Dev. Corp.

[29] Pre-filing Report at para 38-39.
[30] Pre-filing Report at para 40.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Tab 5

1993 CarswellOnt 183
Ontario Court of Justice (General Division — Commercial List)

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re

1993 CarswellOnt 183, [1993] O.J. No. 14, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 37 A.C.W.S. (3d) 847, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275

Re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36; Re Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-43; Re plan of compromise in respect of LEHNDORFF GENERAL PARTNER LTD. (in its own capacity and in its capacity as general partner of LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA), LEHNDORFF PROPERTIES (CANADA) and LEHNDORFF PROPERTIES (CANADA) II) and in respect of certain of their nominees LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA) LTD., LEHNDORFF CANADIAN HOLDINGS LTD., LEHNDORFF CANADIAN HOLDINGS II LTD., BAYTEMP PROPERTIES LIMITED and 102 BLOOR STREET WEST LIMITED and in respect of THG LEHNDORFF VERMÖGENSVERWALTUNG GmbH (in its capacity as limited partner of LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA))

Farley J.

Heard: December 24, 1992
Judgment: January 6, 1993
Docket: Doc. B366/92

Counsel: *Alfred Apps, Robert Harrison* and *Melissa J. Kennedy* , for applicants.
L. Crozier , for Royal Bank of Canada.
R.C. Heintzman , for Bank of Montreal.
J. Hodgson, Susan Lundy and *James Hilton* , for Canada Trustco Mortgage Corporation.
Jay Schwartz , for Citibank Canada.
Stephen Golick , for Peat Marwick Thorne * Inc., proposed monitor.
John Teolis , for Fuji Bank Canada.
Robert Thorton , for certain of the advisory boards.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Headnote

Corporations --- Arrangements and compromises — Under Companies' Creditors Arrangements Act — Arrangements — Effect of arrangement — Stay of proceedings

Corporations — Arrangements and compromises — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Stay of proceedings — Stay being granted even where it would affect non-applicants that were not companies within meaning of Act — Business operations of applicants and non-applicants being so intertwined as to make stay appropriate.

The applicant companies were involved in property development and management and sought the protection of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") in order that they could present a plan of compromise. They also sought a stay of all proceedings against the individual company applicants either in their own capacities or because of their interest in a larger group of companies. Each of the applicant companies was insolvent and had outstanding debentures issued under trust deeds. They proposed a plan of compromise among themselves and the holders of the debentures as well as those others of their secured and unsecured creditors deemed appropriate in the circumstances.

A question arose as to whether the court had the power to grant a stay of proceedings against non-applicants that were not companies and, therefore, not within the express provisions of the CCAA.

Held:

The application was allowed.

It was appropriate, given the significant financial intertwining of the applicant companies, that a consolidated plan be approved. Further, each of the applicant companies had a realistic possibility of being able to continue operating even though each was currently unable to meet all of its expenses. This was precisely the sort of situation in which all of the creditors would likely benefit from the application of the CCAA and in which it was appropriate to grant an order staying proceedings.

The inherent power of the court to grant stays can be used to supplement s. 11 of the CCAA when it is just and reasonable to do so. Clearly, the court had the jurisdiction to grant a stay in respect of any of the applicants that were companies fitting the criteria in the CCAA. However, the stay requested also involved limited partnerships where (1) the applicant companies acted on behalf of the limited partnerships, or (2) the stay would be effective against any proceedings taken by any party against the property assets and undertakings of the limited partnerships in which they held a direct interest. The business operations of the applicant companies were so intertwined with the limited partnerships that it would be impossible for a stay to be granted to the applicant companies that would affect their business without affecting the undivided interest of the limited partnerships in the business. As a result, it was just and reasonable to supplement s. 11 and grant the stay.

While the provisions of the CCAA allow for a cramdown of a creditor's claim, as well as the interest of any other person, anyone wishing to start or continue proceedings against the applicant companies could use the comeback clause in the order to persuade the court that it would not be just and reasonable to maintain the stay. In such a motion, the onus would be on the applicant companies to show that it was appropriate in the circumstances to continue the stay.

Application under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to file consolidated plan of compromise and for stay of proceedings.

***Farley J.*:**

1 These are my written reasons relating to the relief granted the applicants on December 24, 1992 pursuant to their application under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* , R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("CCAA") and the *Courts of Justice Act* , R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 ("CJA"). The relief sought was as follows:

> (a) short service of the notice of application;
>
> (b) a declaration that the applicants were companies to which the CCAA applies;
>
> (c) authorization for the applicants to file a consolidated plan of compromise;
>
> (d) authorization for the applicants to call meetings of their secured and unsecured creditors to approve the consolidated plan of compromise;
>
> (e) a stay of all proceedings taken or that might be taken either in respect of the applicants in their own capacity or on account of their interest in Lehndorff United Properties (Canada) ("LUPC"), Lehndorff Properties (Canada) ("LPC") and Lehndorff Properties (Canada) II ("LPC II") and collectively (the "Limited Partnerships") whether as limited partner, as general partner or as registered titleholder to certain of their assets as bare trustee and nominee; and
>
> (f) certain other ancillary relief.

2 The applicants are a number of companies within the larger Lehndorff group ("Group") which operates in Canada and elsewhere. The group appears to have suffered in the same way that a number of other property

developers and managers which have also sought protection under the CCAA in recent years. The applicants are insolvent; they each have outstanding debentures issues under trust deeds; and they propose a plan of compromise among themselves and the holders of these debentures as well as those others of their secured and unsecured creditors as they deemed appropriate in the circumstances. Each applicant except THG Lehndorff Vermögensverwaltung GmbH ("GmbH") is an Ontario corporation. GmbH is a company incorporated under the laws of Germany. Each of the applicants has assets or does business in Canada. Therefore each is a "company" within the definition of s. 2 of the CCAA. The applicant Lehndorff General Partner Ltd. ("General Partner Company") is the sole general partner of the Limited Partnerships. The General Partner Company has sole control over the property and businesses of the Limited Partnerships. All major decisions concerning the applicants (and the Limited Partnerships) are made by management operating out of the Lehndorff Toronto Office. The applicants aside from the General Partner Company have as their sole purpose the holding of title to properties as bare trustee or nominee on behalf of the Limited Partnerships. LUPC is a limited partnership registered under the *Limited Partnership Act* , R.S.O. 1990, c. L.16 ("Ontario LPA"). LPC and LPC II are limited partnerships registered under Part 2 of the *Partnership Act* , R.S.A. 1980, c. P-2 ("Alberta PA") and each is registered in Ontario as an extra provincial limited partnership. LUPC has over 2,000 beneficial limited partners, LPC over 500 and LPC II over 250, most of whom are residents of Germany. As at March 31, 1992 LUPC had outstanding indebtedness of approximately $370 million, LPC $45 million and LPC II $7 million. Not all of the members of the Group are making an application under the CCAA. Taken together the Group's indebtedness as to Canadian matters (including that of the applicants) was approximately $543 million. In the summer of 1992 various creditors (Canada Trustco Mortgage Company, Bank of Montreal, Royal Bank of Canada, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and the Bank of Tokyo Canada) made demands for repayment of their loans. On November 6, 1992 Funtanua Investments Limited, a minor secured lendor also made a demand. An interim standstill agreement was worked out following a meeting of July 7, 1992. In conjunction with Peat Marwick Thorne Inc. which has been acting as an informal monitor to date and Fasken Campbell Godfrey the applicants have held multiple meetings with their senior secured creditors over the past half year and worked on a restructuring plan. The business affairs of the applicants (and the Limited Partnerships) are significantly intertwined as there are multiple instances of intercorporate debt, cross-default provisions and guarantees and they operated a centralized cash management system.

3 This process has now evolved to a point where management has developed a consolidated restructuring plan which plan addresses the following issues:

(a) The compromise of existing conventional, term and operating indebtedness, both secured and unsecured.

(b) The restructuring of existing project financing commitments.

(c) New financing, by way of equity or subordinated debt.

(d) Elimination or reduction of certain overhead.

(e) Viability of existing businesses of entities in the Lehndorff Group.

(f) Restructuring of income flows from the limited partnerships.

(g) Disposition of further real property assets aside from those disposed of earlier in the process.

(h) Consolidation of entities in the Group; and

(i) Rationalization of the existing debt and security structure in the continuing entities in the Group.

Formal meetings of the beneficial limited partners of the Limited Partnerships are scheduled for January 20 and 21, 1993 in Germany and an information circular has been prepared and at the time of hearing was being translated

into German. This application was brought on for hearing at this time for two general reasons: (a) it had now ripened to the stage of proceeding with what had been distilled out of the strategic and consultative meetings; and (b) there were creditors other than senior secured lenders who were in a position to enforce their rights against assets of some of the applicants (and Limited Partnerships) which if such enforcement did take place would result in an undermining of the overall plan. Notice of this hearing was given to various creditors: Barclays Bank of Canada, Barclays Bank PLC, Bank of Montreal, Citibank Canada, Canada Trustco Mortgage Corporation, Royal Trust Corporation of Canada, Royal Bank of Canada, the Bank of Tokyo Canada, Funtauna Investments Limited, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Fuji Bank Canada and First City Trust Company. In this respect the applicants have recognized that although the initial application under the CCAA may be made on an ex parte basis (s. 11 of the CCAA; *Re Langley's Ltd.*, [1938] O.R. 123, [1938] 3 D.L.R. 230 (C.A.) ; *Re Keppoch Development Ltd.* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 95 (N.S. T.D.) . The court will be concerned when major creditors have not been alerted even in the most minimal fashion (*Re Inducon Development Corp.* (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 310). The application was either supported or not opposed.

4 "Instant" debentures are now well recognized and respected by the courts: see *Re United Maritime Fishermen Co-operative* (1988), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 44 (N.B. Q.B.) , at pp. 55-56, varied on reconsideration (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 170 (N.B. Q.B.) , reversed on different grounds (1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 161 (N.B. C.A.) , at pp. 165-166; *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.* (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 248 (B.C. S.C.) at pp. 250-251; *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289, 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101 (C.A.) per Doherty J.A., dissenting on another point, at pp. 306-310 (O.R.); *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of)* (sub nom. *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Gammon*) (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 321 (Gen. Div.) at p. 327. The applicants would appear to me to have met the technical hurdle of s. 3 and as defined s. 2) of the CCAA in that they are debtor companies since they are insolvent, they have outstanding an issue of debentures under a trust deed and the compromise or arrangement that is proposed includes that compromise between the applicants and the holders of those trust deed debentures. I am also satisfied that because of the significant intertwining of the applicants it would be appropriate to have a consolidated plan. I would also understand that this court (Ontario Court of Justice (General Division)) is the appropriate court to hear this application since all the applicants except GmbH have their head office or their chief place of business in Ontario and GmbH, although it does not have a place of business within Canada, does have assets located within Ontario.

5 The CCAA is intended to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors as an alternative to bankruptcy and, as such, is remedial legislation entitled to a liberal interpretation. It seems to me that the purpose of the statute is to enable insolvent companies to carry on business in the ordinary course or otherwise deal with their assets so as to enable plan of compromise or arrangement to be prepared, filed and considered by their creditors and the court. In the interim, a judge has great discretion under the CCAA to make order so as to effectively maintain the status quo in respect of an insolvent company while it attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for the proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both the company and its creditors. See the preamble to and sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 11 of the CCAA; *Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, [1934] S.C.R. 659 at p. 661, 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75 ; *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank*, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215 (Alta. Q.B.) at pp. 219-220; *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361 (Q.B.) , at pp. 12-13 (C.B.R.); *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (B.C. C.A.) , at pp. 310-311, affirming (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 291, 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.) , leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 164 (S.C.C.) .; *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* , supra, at p. 307 (O.R.); *Fine's Flowers v. Fine's Flowers (Creditors of)* (1992), 7 O.R. (3d) 193 (Gen. Div.) , at p. 199 and "Reorganizations Under The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act", Stanley E. Edwards (1947) 25 Can. Bar Rev. 587 at p. 592.

6 The CCAA is intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both. Where a debtor company realistically plans to continue operating or to otherwise deal with its assets but it requires the protection of the court in order to do so and it is

otherwise too early for the court to determine whether the debtor company will succeed, relief should be granted under the CCAA. see *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* , supra at pp. 297 and 316; *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.* , supra, at pp. 251-252 and *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of)* , supra, at p. 328 and p. 330. It has been held that the intention of the CCAA is to prevent any manoeuvres for positioning among the creditors during the period required to develop a plan and obtain approval of creditors. Such manoeuvres could give an aggressive creditor an advantage to the prejudice of others who are less aggressive and would undermine the company's financial position making it even less likely that the plan will succeed: see *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank* , supra, at p. 220 (W.W.R.). The possibility that one or more creditors may be prejudiced should not affect the court's exercise of its authority to grant a stay of proceedings under the CCAA because this affect is offset by the benefit to all creditors and to the company of facilitating a reorganization. The court's primary concerns under the CCAA must be for the debtor and *all* of the creditors: see *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* , supra, at pp. 108-110; *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84 (C.A.) , at pp. 315-318 (C.B.R.) and *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.* , supra, at pp. 251-252.

7 One of the purposes of the CCAA is to facilitate ongoing operations of a business where its assets have a greater value as part of an integrated system than individually. The CCAA facilitates reorganization of a company where the alternative, sale of the property piecemeal, is likely to yield far less satisfaction to the creditors. Unlike the *Bankruptcy Act* , R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, before the amendments effective November 30, 1992 to transform it into the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* ("BIA"), it is possible under the CCAA to bind secured creditors it has been generally speculated that the CCAA will be resorted to by companies that are generally larger and have a more complicated capital structure and that those companies which make an application under the BIA will be generally smaller and have a less complicated structure. Reorganization may include partial liquidation where it is intended as part of the process of a return to long term viability and profitability. See *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* , supra, at p. 318 and *Re Associated Investors of Canada Ltd.* (1987), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Alta. Q.B.) at pp. 245, reversed on other grounds at (1988), 71 C.B.R. (N.S.) 71 (Alta. C.A.) . It appears to me that the purpose of the CCAA is also to protect the interests of creditors and to enable an orderly distribution of the debtor company's affairs. This may involve a winding-up or liquidation of a company or simply a substantial downsizing of its business operations, provided the same is proposed in the best interests of the creditors generally. See *Re Associated Investors of Canada Ltd.* , supra, at p. 318; *Re Amirault Fish Co.*, 32 C.B.R. 186, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 203 (N.S. T.D.) at pp. 187-188 (C.B.R.).

8 It strikes me that each of the applicants in this case has a realistic possibility of being able to continue operating, although each is currently unable to meet all of its expenses albeit on a reduced scale. This is precisely the sort of circumstance in which all of the creditors are likely to benefit from the application of the CCAA and in which it is appropriate to grant an order staying proceedings so as to allow the applicant to finalize preparation of and file a plan of compromise and arrangement.

9 Let me now review the aspect of the stay of proceedings. Section 11 of the CCAA provides as follows:

> 11. Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy Act* or the *Winding-up Act* , whenever an application has been made under this Act in respect of any company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit,
>
> (*a*) make an order staying, until such time as the court may prescribe or until any further order, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy Act* and the *Winding-up Act* or either of them;
>
> (*b*) restrain further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company on such terms as the court sees fit; and

(*c*) make an order that no suit, action or other proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except with the leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court imposes.

10 The power to grant a stay of proceeding should be construed broadly in order to permit the CCAA to accomplish its legislative purpose and in particular to enable continuance of the company seeking CCAA protection. The power to grant a stay therefore extends to a stay which affected the position not only of the company's secured and unsecured creditors, but also all non-creditors and other parties who could potentially jeopardize the success of the plan and thereby the continuance of the company. See *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* , supra, at pp. 12-17 (C.B.R.) and *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* , supra, at pp. 296-298 (B.C. S.C.) and pp. 312-314 (B.C. C.A.) and *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank* , supra, at pp. 219 ff. Further the court has the power to order a stay that is effective in respect of the rights arising in favour of secured creditors under all forms of commercial security: see *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* , supra, at p. 320 where Gibbs J.A. for the court stated:

> The trend which emerges from this sampling will be given effect here by holding that where the word "security" occurs in the C.C.A.A., it includes s. 178 security and, where the word creditor occurs, it includes a bank holding s. 178 security. To the extent that there may be conflict between the two statutes, therefore, the broad scope of the C.C.A.A. prevails.

11 The power to grant a stay may also extend to preventing persons seeking to terminate or cancel executory contracts, including, without limitation agreements with the applying companies for the supply of goods or services, from doing so: see *Gaz Métropolitain v. Wynden Canada Inc.* (1982), 44 C.B.R. (N.S.) 285 (C.S. Que.) at pp. 290-291 and *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* , supra, at pp. 311-312 (B.C. C.A.). The stay may also extend to prevent a mortgagee from proceeding with foreclosure proceedings (see *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 141 (B.C. S.C.) or to prevent landlords from terminating leases, or otherwise enforcing their rights thereunder (see *Feifer v. Frame Manufacturing Corp.* (1947), 28 C.B.R. 124 (C.A. Que.)). Amounts owing to landlords in respect of arrears of rent or unpaid rent for the unexpired portion of lease terms are properly dealt with in a plan of compromise or arrangement: see *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312 (Ont. Gen. Div.) especially at p. 318. The jurisdiction of the court to make orders under the CCAA in the interest of protecting the debtor company so as to enable it to prepare and file a plan is effective notwithstanding the terms of any contract or instrument to which the debtor company is a party. Section 8 of the CCAA provides:

> 8. This Act extends and does not limit the provisions of any instrument now or hereafter existing that governs the rights of creditors or any class of them and has full force and effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in that instrument.

The power to grant a stay may also extend to prevent persons from exercising any right of set off in respect of the amounts owed by such a person to the debtor company, irrespective of whether the debtor company has commenced any action in respect of which the defense of set off might be formally asserted: see *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* , supra, at pp. 312-314 (B.C.C.A.).

12 It was submitted by the applicants that the power to grant a stay of proceedings may also extend to a stay of proceedings against non-applicants who are not companies and accordingly do not come within the express provisions of the CCAA. In support thereof they cited a CCAA order which was granted staying proceedings against individuals who guaranteed the obligations of a debtor-applicant which was a qualifying company under the terms of the CCAA: see *Re Slavik* , unreported, [1992] B.C.J. No. 341 [now reported at 12 C.B.R. (3d) 157 (B.C. S.C.)]. However in the *Slavik* situation the individual guarantors were officers and shareholders of two companies which had sought and obtained CCAA protection. Vickers J. in that case indicated that the facts of that case included the following unexplained and unamplified fact [at p. 159]:

5. The order provided further that all creditors of Norvik Timber Inc. be enjoined from making demand for payment upon that firm or upon any guarantor of an obligation of the firm until further order of the court.

The CCAA reorganization plan involved an assignment of the claims of the creditors to "Newco" in exchange for cash and shares. However the basis of the stay order originally granted was not set forth in this decision.

13 It appears to me that Dickson J. in *International Donut Corp. v. 050863 N.D. Ltd.* , unreported, [1992] N.B.J. No. 339 (N.B. Q.B.) [now reported at 127 N.B.R. (2d) 290, 319 A.P.R. 290] was focusing only on the stay arrangements of the CCAA when concerning a limited partnership situation he indicated [at p. 295 N.B.R.]:

> In August 1991 the limited partnership, through its general partner the plaintiff, applied to the Court under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* , R.S.C., c. C-36 for an order delaying the assertion of claims by creditors until an opportunity could be gained to work out with the numerous and sizable creditors a compromise of their claims. An order was obtained but it in due course expired without success having been achieved in arranging with creditors a compromise. *That effort may have been wasted, because it seems questionable that the federal Act could have any application to a limited partnership in circumstances such as these* . (Emphasis added.)

14 I am not persuaded that the words of s. 11 which are quite specific as relating as to a *company* can be enlarged to encompass something other than that. However it appears to me that Blair J. was clearly in the right channel in his analysis in *Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd.* unreported, [1992] O.J. No. 1946 [now reported at 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (Ont. Gen. Div.)] at pp. 4-7 [at pp. 308-310 C.B.R.].

> **The Power to Stay**
>
> The court has always had an inherent jurisdiction to grant a stay of proceedings whenever it is just and convenient to do so, in order to control its process or prevent an abuse of that process: see *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance Co.* (1982), 29 C.P.C. 60, 137 D.L.R. (3d) 287 (Ont. H.C.) , and cases referred to therein. In the civil context, this general power is also embodied in the very broad terms of s. 106 of the *Courts of Justice Act* , R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, which provides as follows:
>
> > 106. A court, on its own initiative or on motion by any person, whether or not a party, may stay any proceeding in the court on such terms as are considered just.
>
> Recently, Mr. Justice O'Connell has observed that this discre tionary power is "highly dependent on the facts of each particular case": *Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim* (unreported) [(June 25, 1992), Doc. 24127/88 (Ont. Gen. Div.)], [1992] O.J. No. 1330.
>
> Apart from this inherent and general jurisdiction to stay proceedings, there are many instances where the court is specifically granted the power to stay in a particular context, by virtue of statute or under the *Rules of Civil Procedure* . The authority to prevent multiplicity of proceedings in the same court, under r. 6.01(1), is an example of the latter. The power to stay judicial and extra-judicial proceedings under s. 11 of the C.C.A.A., is an example of the former. Section 11 of the C.C.A.A. provides as follows.
>
> **The Power to Stay in the Context of C.C.A.A. Proceedings**
>
> By its formal title the C.C.A.A. is known as "An Act to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors". To ensure the effective nature of such a "facilitative" process it is essential that the debtor company be afforded a respite from the litigious and other rights being exercised by creditors, while it attempts to carry on as a going concern and to negotiate an acceptable corporate restructuring arrangement with such creditors.

In this respect it has been observed that the C.C.A.A. is "to be used as a practical and effective way of restructuring corporate indebtedness.": see the case comment following the report of *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361, 92 A.R. 81 (Q.B.) , and the approval of that remark as "a perceptive observation about the attitude of the courts" by Gibbs J.A. in *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 105 (C.A.) at p. 113 [B.C.L.R.].

Gibbs J.A. continued with this comment:

> To the extent that a general principle can be extracted from the few cases directly on point, and the others in which there is persuasive obiter, it would appear to be that the courts have concluded that under s. 11 there is *a discretionary power to restrain judicial or extra-judicial conduct* against the debtor company *the effect of which is, or would be, seriously to impair the ability of the debtor company to continue in business during the compromise or arrangement negotiating period* .

(emphasis added)

I agree with those sentiments and would simply add that, in my view, the restraining power extends as well to conduct which could seriously impair the debtor's ability to focus and concentrate its efforts on the business purpose of negotiating the compromise or arrangement. [In this respect, see also *Sairex GmbH v. Prudential Steel Ltd.* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 62 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 77.]

I must have regard to these foregoing factors while I consider, as well, the general principles which have historically governed the court's exercise of its power to stay proceedings. These principles were reviewed by Mr. Justice Montgomery in *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance* , supra (a "Mississauga Derailment" case), at pp. 65-66 [C.P.C.]. The balance of convenience must weigh significantly in favour of granting the stay, as a party's right to have access to the courts must not be lightly interfered with. The court must be satisfied that a continuance of the proceeding would serve as an injustice to the party seeking the stay, in the sense that it would be oppressive or vexatious or an abuse of the process of the court in some other way. The stay must not cause an injustice to the plaintiff.

It is quite clear from *Empire-Universal Films Limited v. Rank*, [1947] O.R. 775 (H.C.) that McRuer C.J.H.C. considered that *The Judicature Act* [R.S.O. 1937, c. 100] then [and now the CJA] merely confirmed a statutory right that previously had been considered inherent in the jurisdiction of the court with respect to its authority to grant a stay of proceedings. See also *McCordic v. Bosanquet* (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 53 (H.C.) and *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allen-Dale Mutual Insurance Co.* (1982), 29 C.P.C. 60 (H.C.) at pp. 65-66.

15 Montgomery J. in *Canada Systems* , supra, at pp. 65-66 indicated:

> Goodman J. (as he then was) in *McCordic v. Bosanquet* (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 53 in granting a stay reviewed the authorities and concluded that the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to grant a stay of proceedings may be made whenever it is just and reasonable to do so. "This court has ample jurisdiction to grant a stay whenever it is just and reasonable to do so." (Per Lord Denning M.R. in *Edmeades v. Thames Board Mills Ltd.*, [1969] 2 Q.B. 67 at 71, [1969] 2 All E.R. 127 (C.A.)). Lord Denning's decision in *Edmeades* was approved by Lord Justice Davies in *Lane v. Willis; Lane v. Beach (Executor of Estate of George William Willis)*, [1972] 1 All E.R. 430, *(*sub nom. *Lane v. Willis; Lane v. Beach)* [1972] 1 W.L.R. 326 (C.A.) .
>
> . . . . .
>
> In *Weight Watchers Int. Inc. v. Weight Watchers of Ont. Ltd.* (1972), 25 D.L.R. (3d) 419, 5 C.P.R. (2d) 122 , appeal allowed by consent without costs *(*sub nom. *Weight Watchers of Ont. Ltd. v. Weight Watchers Inc. Inc.)* 42 D.L.R. (3d) 320n, 10 C.P.R. (2d) 96n (Fed. C.A.) , Mr. Justice Heald on an application for stay said at p. 426 [25 D.L.R.]:

> The principles which must govern in these matters are clearly stated in the case of *Empire Universal Films Ltd. et al. v. Rank et al.*, [1947] O.R. 775 at p. 779, as follows [quoting *St. Pierre et al. v. South American Stores (Gath & Chaves), Ltd. et al.*, [1936] 1 K.B. 382 at p. 398]:
>
> > (1.) A mere balance of convenience is not a sufficient ground for depriving a plaintiff of the advantages of prosecuting his action in an English Court if it is otherwise properly brought. The right of access to the King's Court must not be lightly refused. (2.) In order to justify a stay two conditions must be satisfied, one positive and the other negative: (a) the defendant must satisfy the Court that the continuance of the action would work an injustice because it would be oppressive or vexatious to him or would be an abuse of the process of the Court in some other way; and (b) the stay must not cause an injustice to the plaintiff. On both the burden of proof is on the defendant.

16 Thus it appears to me that the inherent power of this court to grant stays can be used to supplement s. 11 of the CCAA when it is just and reasonable to do so. Is it appropriate to do so in the circumstances? Clearly there is jurisdiction under s. 11 of the CCAA to grant a stay in respect of any of the applicants which are all companies which fit the criteria of the CCAA. However the stay requested also involved the limited partnerships to some degree either (i) with respect to the applicants acting on behalf of the Limited Partnerships or (ii) the stays being effective vis-à-vis any proceedings taken by any party against the property assets and undertaking of the Limited Partnerships in respect of which they hold a direct interest (collectively the "Property") as set out in the terms of the stay provisions of the order paragraphs 4 through 18 inclusive attached as an appendix to these reasons. [Appendix omitted.] I believe that an analysis of the operations of a limited partnership in this context would be beneficial to an understanding of how there is a close inter-relationship to the applicants involved in this CCAA proceedings and how the Limited Partnerships and their Property are an integral part of the operations previously conducted and the proposed restructuring.

17 A limited partnership is a creation of statute, consisting of one or more general partners and one or more limited partners. The limited partnership is an investment vehicle for passive investment by limited partners. It in essence combines the flow through concept of tax depreciation or credits available to "ordinary" partners under general partnership law with limited liability available to shareholders under corporate law. See Ontario LPA sections 2(2) and 3(1) and Lyle R. Hepburn, *Limited Partnerships* , (Toronto: De Boo, 1991), at p. 1-2 and p. 1-12. I would note here that the limited partnership provisions of the Alberta PA are roughly equivalent to those found in the Ontario LPA with the interesting side aspect that the Alberta legislation in s. 75 does allow for judgment against a limited partner to be charged against the limited partner's interest in the limited partnership. A general partner has all the rights and powers and is subject to all the restrictions and liabilities of a partner in a partnership. In particular a general partner is fully liable to each creditor of the business of the limited partnership. The general partner has sole control over the property and business of the limited partnership: see Ontario LPA ss. 8 and 13. Limited partners have no liability to the creditors of the limited partnership's business; the limited partners' financial exposure is limited to their contribution. The limited partners do not have any "independent" ownership rights in the property of the limited partnership. The entitlement of the limited partners is limited to their contribution plus any profits thereon, after satisfaction of claims of the creditors. See Ontario LPA sections 9, 11, 12(1), 13, 15(2) and 24. The process of debtor and creditor relationships associated with the limited partnership's business are between the general partner and the creditors of the business. In the event of the creditors collecting on debt and enforcing security, the creditors can only look to the assets of the limited partnership together with the assets of the general partner including the general partner's interest in the limited partnership. This relationship is recognized under the *Bankruptcy Act* (now the BIA) sections 85 and 142.

18 A general partner is responsible to defend proceedings against the limited partnership in the firm name, so in procedural law and in practical effect, a proceeding against a limited partnership is a proceeding against the general partner. See Ontario *Rules of Civil Procedure* , O. Reg. 560/84, Rules 8.01 and 8.02.

19 It appears that the preponderance of case law supports the contention that contention that a partnership including a limited partnership is not a separate legal entity. See *Lindley on Partnership* , 15th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1984), at pp. 33-35; *Seven Mile Dam Contractors v. R.* (1979), 13 B.C.L.R. 137 (S.C.) , affirmed (1980), 25 B.C.L.R. 183 (C.A.) and "Extra-Provincial Liability of the Limited Partner", Brad A. Milne, (1985) 23 Alta. L. Rev. 345, at pp. 350-351. Milne in that article made the following observations:

> The preponderance of case law therefore supports the contention that a limited partnership is not a separate legal entity. It appears, nevertheless, that the distinction made in *Re Thorne* between partnerships and trade unions could not be applied to limited partnerships which, like trade unions, must rely on statute for their validity. The mere fact that limited partnerships owe their existence to the statutory provision is probably not sufficient to endow the limited partnership with the attribute of legal personality as suggested in *Ruzicks* unless it appeared that the Legislature clearly intended that the limited partnership should have a separate legal existence. A review of the various provincial statutes does not reveal any procedural advantages, rights or powers that are fundamentally different from those advantages enjoyed by ordinary partnerships. The legislation does not contain any provision resembling section 15 of the *Canada Business Corporation Act* [S.C. 1974-75, c. 33, as am.] which expressly states that a corporation has the capacity, both in and outside of Canada, of a natural person. It is therefore difficult to imagine that the Legislature intended to create a new category of legal entity.

20 It appears to me that the operations of a limited partnership in the ordinary course are that the limited partners take a completely passive role (they must or they will otherwise lose their limited liability protection which would have been their sole reason for choosing a limited partnership vehicle as opposed to an "ordinary" partnership vehicle). For a lively discussion of the question of "control" in a limited partnership as contrasted with shareholders in a corporation, see R. Flannigan, "The Control Test of Investor Liability in Limited Partnerships" (1983) 21 Alta. L. Rev. 303; E. Apps, "Limited Partnerships and the 'Control' Prohibition: Assessing the Liability of Limited Partners" (1991) 70 Can. Bar Rev. 611; R. Flannigan, "Limited Partner Liability: A Response" (1992) 71 Can. Bar Rev. 552. The limited partners leave the running of the business to the general partner and in that respect the care, custody and the maintenance of the property, assets and undertaking of the limited partnership in which the limited partners and the general partner hold an interest. The ownership of this limited partnership property, assets and undertaking is an undivided interest which cannot be segregated for the purpose of legal process. It seems to me that there must be afforded a protection of the whole since the applicants' individual interest therein cannot be segregated without in effect dissolving the partnership arrangement. The limited partners have two courses of action to take if they are dissatisfied with the general partner or the operation of the limited partnership as carried on by the general partner — the limited partners can vote to (a) remove the general partner and replace it with another or (b) dissolve the limited partnership. However Flannigan strongly argues that an unfettered right to remove the general partner would attach general liability for the limited partners (and especially as to the question of continued enjoyment of favourable tax deductions) so that it is prudent to provide this as a conditional right: *Control Test* , (1992), supra, at pp. 524-525. Since the applicants are being afforded the protection of a stay of proceedings in respect to allowing them time to advance a reorganization plan and complete it if the plan finds favour, there should be a stay of proceedings (vis-à-vis any action which the limited partners may wish to take as to replacement or dissolution) through the period of allowing the limited partners to vote on the reorganization plan itself.

21 It seems to me that using the inherent jurisdiction of this court to supplement the statutory stay provisions of s. 11 of the CCAA would be appropriate in the circumstances; it would be just and reasonable to do so. The business operations of the applicants are so intertwined with the limited partnerships that it would be impossible for relief as to a stay to be granted to the applicants which would affect their business without at the same time extending that stay to the undivided interests of the limited partners in such. It also appears that the applicants are well on their way to presenting a reorganization plan for consideration and a vote; this is scheduled to happen

within the month so there would not appear to be any significant time inconvenience to any person interested in pursuing proceedings. While it is true that the provisions of the CCAA allow for a cramdown of a creditor's claim (as well as an interest of any other person), those who wish to be able to initiate or continue proceedings against the applicants may utilize the comeback clause in the order to persuade the court that it would not be just and reasonable to maintain that particular stay. It seems to me that in such a comeback motion the onus would be upon the applicants to show that in the circumstances it was appropriate to continue the stay.

22 The order is therefore granted as to the relief requested including the proposed stay provisions.

Application allowed.

Footnotes

* As amended by the court.